Moral Law as a Law of Reason

In the previous post I looked at what some philosophers say about how feelings are the ultimate determiners of our setting of aims. Some would go so far as to assert that morality itself depends on the feelings of the person making the moral judgement. Other philosophers react against this, with the view that the moral standard is a law of reason.

If these philosophers are correct, then moral standards are fixed and unchanging. The moral law would then be a law of nature, comparable to, but not identical with, such laws as the law of gravity. One form of this theory is that good actions are necessarily consistent actions. Thus a bad action would be a denial, and a good action an affirmation, of the real state of things.

For example, if a man steals a car and drives away with it, it is a bad action because he is not thinking of the car as being what it is (someone else's car), so he is denying things as they are, and contradicting the law of reason. The thief is affirming a falsehood. Again, they have argued that a man who beats is wife is in a way denying that she is his wife.

Some philosophers go further than this. They agree that it is true that the bad action is one that is inconsistent, but it is inconsistent not with an objective fact but with an ideal. Under this view, stealing is wrong not because it is a denial of an objective fact about the stolen property, but because the action is inconsistent with an ideal relationship between human beings.

The philosopher Kant held that when a person does a bad action, the inconsistency lies in the fact that they are acting according to a principle which they are not willing to allow others to follow as their principle. Under this definition, a person who only performs good actions is one who is at all times prepared to let others act on the same principles.

The philosopher says: In the lower forms of goodness, the actions of an individual form a coherent whole among themselves. In higher forms of goodness, they form a coherent system with the actions of one's own society. In the highest forms of goodness, they form a coherent system with all other acts of willing in the universe.

Reason as a Motive to Action

Aristotle was of the opinion (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6) that the aim or end of the process of willing is set only by our desires, and that reason is required to discover the means to achieve those ends. This was echoed by David Hume, who wrote, in Treatise on Human Nature, that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions". Thus the ends at which we aim are determined by our innate instincts and preferences, leaving reason to assist only in finding the best ways to attain these ends.

This view has in the past been challenged in a variety of ways.

1. Sometimes the desire to act in a consistent manner and avoid contradiction - as it is sometimes called, to behave rationally - may override other desires. Thus a thief may feel a pang of pity for his victims, but he would very likely pull himself together by arguing that he should not allow his emotions to get in the way of pursuing his professional calling.

2. When there is a choice of desirable options to aim for, then reason will be called on to choose between them, so in that sense, reason could be said to be setting the aims in this situation.

3. A strong criticism of the theory is that it makes an artificial distinction between reason and desire which does not exist in practice. The mind exists and operates as a unity, with the "component" parts of it working together in a seamless manner.

4. Reason and reflection may suggest a course of action, and if this is later accompanied by a desire the action may be put into effect. Some might argue that desire is still the determining factor, but here, reasoning has also played a part.

5. Introspection (a reasoning process) may lead us to suspend our judgement, and leave the execution of a desirable course of action until a later time, after which it may happen that other considerations have arisen which will influence our desires. For example, if I write an angry letter to someone, it may happen that if I do not send it immediately, but perhaps wait until next morning, I may discover some rational considerations which make the sending of the letter seem less desirable.

These objections (and others) can lead us on to the possibility of our actions being determined, not so much by our desires and instincts, as by a "sense of duty" or conscience.

Socrates, who is often celebrated as the founder of Western philosophy, held that knowledge is virtue. In his view, a clear understanding of what is good would inevitably overcome all our other tendencies to action and thus would lead to right conduct.